Last name of the first author | Year of publication | Study design | Intervention(s) | Key finding(s) |
---|---|---|---|---|
Ahmed | 2018 | Review | Workplace social distancing | Modelling studies estimated workplace social distancing reduced the cumulative influenza attack rate 23%. |
Armbruster | 2007 | Modelling | Contact tracing Screening | Contact tracing is cost-effective only when population prevalence is low (e.g. under 8% for tuberculosis) |
Barnes | 2007 | Modelling | Case isolation Personal protection equipment Antiviral prophylaxis | Antiviral prophylaxis can contain an influenza strain with R0 = 2; healthcare workers contribute disproportionately to the transmission of the infection when not protected against infection. |
Becker | 2005 | Modelling | Face masks Social distancing Hand hygiene Case isolation School closures Quarantining affected households Contact tracing | Combinations more effective than single interventions; household quarantines and contact tracing reduced reproduction number from 6 to below 1. |
Bell | 2006 | Review | Travel restrictions | Screening and quarantining entering travellers were ineffective in past pandemics; WHO recommends providing information to international travellers and screening travellers departing infected countries. |
Bell | 2006 | Review | School closures Isolation of patients Quarantine of contacts Antiviral therapy Travel restrictions Hand hygiene Respiratory hygiene Face masks Disinfected household surfaces | At the start of the outbreak, detect and isolate cases, quarantine contacts, restrict travel in and out of affected communities, and consider targeted antiviral therapy. If sustained transmission in the general population, ill persons are advised to remain at home; increase social distance; promote hand-washing and respiratory hygiene/cough etiquette; wear face masks; and disinfect contaminated household surfaces. |
Bin Nafisah | 2018 | Review | School closures | School closures reduced the peak of epidemics by an average of 29.65%. |
Bolton | 2012 | Modelling | School closures Travel restrictions Generalized social distancing Quarantining of close contacts Treatment of cases with antivirals Prophylaxis of contacts | A combination of non-pharmaceutical interventions proved as effective as the targeted use of antivirals and reduced the mean attack rate from approximately 23 to 21% (severe pandemic scenario). |
Bootsma | 2007 | Observational | School closures Church closures Mass gatherings Face masks Case isolation Disinfection/hygiene measures | The timing of interventions during the 1918–1919 flu pandemic (specifically early intervention) was the most strongly correlated factor with total mortality. Population size and density were not significant factors in overall mortality. |
Buonomo | 2012 | Modelling | Health promotion campaign Vaccination | Early vaccination is more cost-effective; interventions before vaccines are available need to be balanced with the potential gains in the cost-effectiveness of future vaccines. |
Caley | 2007 | Modelling | Border screening Face masks during transit Immediate presentation following symptom onset Flight-based quarantining | The most effective strategy to prevent spread is control in the source country; targeting travellers is not effective. |
Chen | 2020 | Modelling | School closure Case isolation Antiviral treatment Antiviral prophylaxis Vaccination | Case isolation was the most effective single intervention, adding antiviral therapeutics, antiviral prophylaxis, vaccination prior to the outbreak, and school closure decreased the attack rate only slightly and shortened outbreak duration by only 9 days |
Chinazzi | 2020 | Modelling | Travel restrictions | 90% travel restrictions to and from China only modestly affect the epidemic trajectory unless combined with a 50% or higher reduction of transmission in the community. |
Chong | 2012 | Modelling | Travel restrictions (air, land, sea) Antiviral treatment | Restricting air travel from infected regions 99% delays epidemic peak up to 2 weeks. Restricting air and land travel delays peak ~3.5 weeks. Neither 90% nor 99% travel restrictions reduced the epidemic magnitude more than 10%. Antiviral treatment and hospitalization of infectious subjects are more effective. |
Dan | 2009 | Modelling | Personal protection equipment Personal protection equipment plus restricting visitors and cancelling elective procedures | Personal protection equipment cost-effective for H1N1 ($23,600 per death prevented) Personal protection equipment plus restricting visitors and cancelling elective procedures less cost-effective ($2500,000 per death prevented) |
Day | 2006 | Modelling | Quarantine | Quarantine of all contacts is beneficial only when case isolation is ineffective, significant asymptomatic transmission, and asymptomatic period is neither very long nor short. |
Figueroa | 2017 | Observational | Mass gatherings | Outbreaks at mass gatherings were uncommon, even during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic |
Gostic | 2020 | Modelling | Traveller screening | Even under best-case assumptions, screening (at border or locally) will miss more than half of people infected with SARS-CoV-2. |
Halder | 2011 | Modelling | School closures Workplace closure Antiviral treatment Household antiviral prophylaxis Extended antiviral prophylaxis | Combinations were more cost-effective than single interventions; best combination included treatment and household prophylaxis using antiviral drugs and limited duration school closure ($632 to $777 per case prevented) |
Halton | 2013 | Review | Surveillance Contact tracing Isolation and quarantine | Contact tracing and progressively earlier isolation of probable SARS cases were associated with control of the SARS outbreak. |
Handel | 2006 | Modelling | Hypothetical interventions | Interventions before vaccines are available must be balanced with potential gains of future vaccines or potential multiple outbreaks. |
Hellewell | 2020 | Modelling | Contact tracing | Highly effective contact tracing and case isolation enough to control a COVID-19 outbreak within 3 months. Transmissibility is an important factor (when Ro = 2.5, 80%+ contacts needed to be traced and isolated). Timing is also important (5 initial cases, 50%+ chance of achieving control, even at modest contact-tracing levels; however, 40 initial cases, control much less likely). Delays from symptom onset to isolation decreased the probability of control. |
Herrera-Diestra | 2019 | Modelling | Vaccination | Vaccinating (or self isolating) based on the number of infected acquaintances is expected to prevent the most infections while requiring the fewest intervention resources. |
Ishola | 2011 | Review | Mass gatherings | Some evidence to indicate that mass gatherings may be associated with an increased risk of influenza transmission |
Jackson | 2014 | Review | School closures | School closures are most effective when they cause large reductions in contact, when the basic reproduction number is below 2, and when attack rates are higher in children than in adults |
Jefferson | 2011 | Review | Screening at entry ports Isolation Quarantine Social distancing Barriers Personal protection Hand hygiene | Overall masks were the best performing intervention across populations, settings, and threats |
Lee | 2009 | Review | Antivirals Antibiotics Vaccination Case isolation Quarantine Personal hygiene measures Social distancing Travel restrictions | Combinations delayed spread, reduced the overall number of cases, and delayed and reduced peak attack rate more than individual strategies. |
Lee | 2011 | Modelling | Hand hygiene Disinfectant measures Patient isolation Personal protection equipment Staff exclusion policies Ward closures | Implementing increased hand hygiene, using protective apparel, staff exclusion policies, or increased disinfection separately or in bundles provided net cost-savings, even when the intervention was only 10% effective in preventing further norovirus transmission. Patient isolation or ward closure was cost-saving only when transmission prevention efficacy was very high (≥90%), and their economic value decreased as the number of beds per room and the number of empty beds per ward increased. |
Lee | 2010 | Modelling | Vaccination | Vaccination priority should be given to at-risk individuals and to children within high-risk groups |
Li | 2013 | Modelling | Quarantine of close contacts | Quarantine in Beijing during 2009 H1N1 reduced confirmed cases by a factor of 5.6; given that H1N1 was mild, “not economically effective”. |
Lin | 2010 | Modelling | Social distancing Case isolation | Supports early containment; the best strategy depends on the transmission characteristics of virus, the state of the pandemic, and the cost and implementation levels of intervention. |
MacIntyre | 2019 | Modelling | Case isolation Contact tracing | Outbreak controlled in 100 days when 95% of cases isolated and 50% of contacts traced. |
MacIntyre | 2015 | Review | Face masks | Face masks provide protection against infection in various community settings |
Markel | 2007 | Observational | School closures Isolation or quarantine Public gathering ban | Cities that implemented interventions earlier had greater delays in reaching peak mortality (Spearman r=−0.74, P<0.001), lower peak mortality rates (Spearman r=0.31, P=.02), and lower total mortality (Spearman r=0.37, P=.008). A significant association between increased duration of interventions and a reduced total mortality burden (Spearman r=−0.39, P=.005). |
Martinez | 2014 | Modelling | School closures Workplace closures Case isolation Household quarantine | School closure was the single most effective intervention; combination of all interventions was most effective. |
Mateus | 2014 | Review | Travel restrictions | Evidence did not support travel restrictions as an isolated intervention for the containment of influenza. |
Nguyen | 2018 | Modelling | Vaccination | Vaccination should be administered 5 months before to 1 week after the start of an epidemic. |
Pan | 2020 | Observational | Traffic restrictions Cancellation of social gatherings Home quarantines Designated hospitals and wards Personal protective equipment Increased testing capacity Quarantine of presumptive cases Quarantine of confirmed cases and of their close contacts | Traffic restrictions, cancellation of social gatherings, and home quarantines are associated with reduced transmission, but not sufficient to prevent increases in confirmed cases. Ro reduced below 1 only when all interventions are implemented. |
Pasquini-Descomps | 2017 | Review | School closures Disease surveillance networks Contact tracing and case isolation Face masks Preventive measures in hospitals Antiviral treatment Antiviral prophylaxis Vaccination Stockpiling antiviral medicine quarantining confirmed cases at home Self-isolation at home | The most cost-effective interventions were disease surveillance networks and contact tracing and case isolation; the least cost-effective intervention was school closure. |
Perlroth | 2010 | Modelling | School closures Quarantine of infected individuals Child social distancing Adult social distancing Antiviral treatment Antiviral prophylaxis | Combinations were more cost-effective than single interventions; the best combination included adult and child social distancing, school closure, and antiviral treatment and prophylaxis ($2700 per case). |
Prosser | 2011 | Modelling | Vaccination | Incremental cost-effectiveness ratios ranged from $8000 to $52,000 per quality-adjusted life year for persons aged 6 months to 64 years without high-risk conditions |
Rainey | 2016 | Review | Mass gatherings | Mass gathering-related respiratory disease outbreaks were relatively rare between 2005 and 2014 in the US, suggesting low transmission at most types of gatherings, even during pandemics |
Rashid | 2015 | Review | School closures | School closures moderately effective in reducing influenza transmission and delaying epidemic peak; associated with very high costs |
Ryu | 2020 | Review | Travel restrictions | Evidence does not support entry screening as an effective measure. |
Sang | 2012 | Modelling | Quarantine Isolation Entry travel screening | Isolation was the best strategy; entry screening delays the peaks but does not prevent the epidemic. |
Saunders-Hastings | 2017 | Modelling | School closure Community-contract reduction Hang hygiene Face mask Voluntary isolation Quarantine Vaccination Antiviral prophylaxis Antiviral treatment | Vaccination plus antiviral treatment most cost-effective (cost per life-year saved: $2581); however, it still led to 3026 life-years lost. Only 1607 life-years lost at a marginally higher cost ($6752) with combination including community-contact reduction, hand hygiene, face masks, voluntary isolation, and antiviral therapy. Combining all interventions saved most lives (267 life-years lost), but very costly ($199,888 per life-year saved). |
Saunders-Hastings | 2017 | Review | Hand hygiene Face masks | Hand hygiene significant protective effect (OR = 0.62; 95% CI 0.52–0.73). Face masks non-significant protective effect (OR = 0.53; 95% CI 0.16–1.71) (randomized control trials and cohort studies) Face masks significant protective effect (OR = 0.41; 95% CI 0.18–0.92) (randomized control trials and cohort studies pooled with case–control studies) |
Schiavo | 2014 | Review | Communicating health risk Promoting disease control measures | Evidence not conclusive |
Shi | 2010 | Modelling | Mass gatherings | Mass gatherings that occur within 10 days before the epidemic peak can result in a 10% relative increase in peak prevalence and total attack rate; little effect when occurring more than 40 days earlier or 20 days after the infection peak (when initial Ro = 1.5) |
Shiell | 1998 | Modelling | Vaccination | Vaccinating all unvaccinated school-aged children was the most cost-effective strategy ($32.90 marginal cost per case prevented). |
Smith | 2015 | Review | School closure Quarantine Social distancing Oral hygiene Hand hygiene Face masks Social gatherings | Positive significant interventions included professional oral hygiene intervention in the elderly and hand washing. |
Suphanchaimat | 2020 | Modelling | Vaccination | Incremental cost-effectiveness ratio of vaccination (compared with routine outbreak control) $1282–$1990/DALY. |
Townsend | 2017 | Modelling | Hand hygiene | National behaviour change programme would net $5.6 billion (3.4–8.6) in India and $2.64 billion (2.08–5.57) in China |
Tracht | 2012 | Modelling | Face masks | $573 billion saved if 50% of the US population used masks in an unmitigated H1N1 epidemic |
Tuncer | 2018 | Modelling | Isolation Quarantine Education Safe burial Social distancing | Social distancing had the most impact on the 2014 Ebola epidemic in Liberia, followed by isolation and quarantine. |
Van Genugten | 2003 | Modelling | Vaccination Antiviral treatment | Similar results from vaccinating the entire population vs. only at-risk groups; best strategy combined pneumococcal vaccination of at-risk groups and antiviral treatment. |
Velasco | 2012 | Review | School closure Antiviral prophylaxis Social distancing Vaccination Quarantine | Combinations were more cost-effective than vaccines and/or antivirals alone; reducing non-essential contacts, using pharmaceutical prophylaxis, and closing schools was the most cost-effective combination. |
Viner | 2020 | Review | School closures | School closures did not help the control of the 2003 SARS epidemic in China, Hong Kong, and Singapore and would prevent only 2–4% of COVID-19 deaths |
Young | 2019 | Modelling | Isolations and quarantines | Case isolation is likely ineffective when the identification of infected hosts is not sufficiently thorough or delayed. |
Zhang | 2015 | Modelling | Voluntary self-isolation Antivirals | Voluntary self-isolation at symptom onset can achieve the same level of effectiveness as starting antiviral prophylaxis; when delayed 2 days, strategy has a limited effect on reducing transmission. |
Zhang | 2012 | Observational | Border screening Close contact tracing (and quarantine) Medical follow-up of international travellers Influenza-like illness monitoring | Border screening: 132/600,000 (0.02%) people infected; contact tracing: 120/4768 (2.5%) infected; medical follow-up of international travellers: 18/346, 847 (0.005%) infected; influenza-like illness monitoring: 339/180,495 (0.2%) infected. |
Zhao | 2020 | Observational | Domestic travel | Each increase of 100 in daily new cases and daily passengers departing from Wuhan was associated with an increase of 16.25% (95% CI: 14.86–17.66%) in daily new cases outside of Wuhan. |